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During the six months of tedious negotiations to put a German coalition in place, governments across Europe, and France in 
particular, have been waiting impatiently for a push for European reform from Berlin. The new coalition agreement between the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD), the conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and her Bavarian sister party CSU puts 
Europe high on the agenda, at least rhetorically. However, both domestic constraints and unbridgeable differences between 
France and Germany could derail the reform agenda. If Chancellor Merkel wants to go beyond a muddling-through approach she 
will have to invest a sizeable share of her political capital – domestically and at the European level. But is she ready to do so? 
 
In-between Summit 
 
The EU Summit on 22/23 March saw the return of Angela Merkel as re-elected Chancellor of Germany. As expected, leaders did 
not address the sensitive areas of European reform, namely the governance of the eurozone, migration and asylum as well as 
security and defence. With the new German government only two weeks in power, time was too short for Berlin to develop a 
consolidated response to President Macron's reform proposals and to achieve sufficient progress towards joint Franco-German 
initiatives to stimulate the EU reform debate. Instead, the European Council dealt with Brexit and responded to urgent foreign 
policy challenges related to President Trump’s threat to impose new US trade tariffs and Britain’s clash with Russia. 
 
Concrete reform discussions at the highest political level have been postponed to the next summit in June 2018. It could be the 
last opportunity for Paris and Berlin to seize the momentum for reform and re-energise the European project: the window of 
opportunity is closing again at the end of the year ahead of the European Parliament elections in May 2019. But despite the time 
pressure, there are several reasons why Berlin is unlikely to commit to an ambitious compromise that could pave the way for 
reshaping the EU. 
 
Domestic constraints 
 
The coalition agreement starts with a strong commitment to Europe, but it remains vague and shallow on major issues. The fact 
that the grand coalition has not drawn any red lines allows the German government more flexibility in finding an agreement with 
Paris and the other 25 member states. However, it also indicates that the coalition partners have not yet reconciled their diverging 
positions, especially when it comes to migration and the future of the eurozone.  
 
On top of this, support for Angela Merkel is slowly fading, even within her conservative bloc. Her handling of the refugee crisis 
and the poor federal election result have left the CDU divided over the future course of the party. As it should be Merkel’s last 
term in office, potential successors will try to take advantage of her slowly eroding influence to challenge her leadership of the 
party and of the coalition. The CSU will also continue to stir the pot ahead of the elections in Bavaria in October 2018 to boost its 
conservative profile. The party is therefore likely to call for a strict position on migration and block substantial agreements on the 
future of the euro area. 
 
New rhetoric, old disputes 
 
There is no doubt that the development and implementation of an ambitious EU reform agenda will require a strong impetus from 
a Franco-German initiative to win broad support. Indeed, from the beginning, President Macron has stressed the significance of 
Paris and Berlin jointly leading the EU reform agenda. The German government also supports the relevance of the partnership 
   
 
 
 
2 
and the need to cooperate, at least in principle. Berlin acknowledges Macron is determined to push through domestic reforms that 
his predecessors Sarkozy and Hollande have failed to implement. Not supporting him on European reforms, a cornerstone of his 
political agenda, would leave Macron weakened. 
 
Yet, these are not sufficient motives for Berlin and Paris to come together and agree to painful compromises. Despite the rosy 
rhetoric and the awareness of structural flaws in the eurozone, France and Germany still find it difficult to overcome their long-
standing differences. While the German government is ready to initiate some reforms, will it go beyond symbolic gestures? 
Proposals such as the setting up of a eurozone budget to fund structural reforms, the creation of a permanent European 
Monetary Fund and the completion of the banking union are on the table. However, the devil is in the detail. Finding an 
agreement with the right balance between solidarity and responsibility or fiscal discipline and risk sharing remains extremely 
complex, especially as the German public strongly rejects any kind of debt mutualisation and risk sharing. 
 
Beyond France and Germany 
 
Even if a German response comes soon and Paris and Berlin put forward sizeable reform measures, it is far from certain that 
they can secure a consensus with the rest of the EU27. Tangible reforms that would help to rebuild trust between member states 
could be under threat, too. For example, just as Germany painstakingly overcame its lengthy coalition-building exercise, Italy was 
forced to grapple with renewed political uncertainty following an overwhelming victory of Eurosceptic parties in the national 
elections. Some policy areas remain fraught with sharp divides. In the field of migration and asylum, any substantial reform 
proposal to change the status quo will receive fierce resistance from governments in Central and Eastern Europe. Discontent is 
also growing on eurozone governance. For instance, a recent statement issued by the finance ministers of the Netherlands and 
seven other member states made it clear that they have no intention of diverging from the goal of fiscal stability. While such a 
statement clearly strengthens the German position, it also reminds Chancellor Merkel of the conditions for support when entering 
negotiations with President Macron. 
 
Channelling scarce political capital 
 
Overall, the preconditions for an agreement on substantial EU reforms do not seem favourable. Chancellor Merkel would have to 
invest a considerable share of her political capital to overcome the barriers that she faces both domestically and at the European 
level to strike a deal. In addition, as it presumably is her last term in office, her political clout will be slowly fading, forcing her to 
prioritise. Her government declaration in the Bundestag ahead of the March Summit was a first indication that her priority will not 
be Europe, but rather overcoming the polarisation within German society by strengthening its cohesion. The favourable economic 
development throughout Europe in the past months and the need to focus on the volatile geopolitical environment, including 
recent confrontations with the USA, Russia and Turkey, could make Germany underestimate the urgency of fixing the structural 
flaws of the EU. So yes, Germany is back – but don’t expect too much. 
 
 
Julian Rappold is Senior Policy Analyst and Project Leader of the joint EPC-Stiftung Mercator project ‘Connecting 
Europe’ at the European Policy Centre. 
 
 
 
 
This Commentary is part of the activities under the European Politics and Institutions programme. 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Commentary are the sole responsibility of the author. 
